



# From Memory Safety to Non-bypassable Security

Towards the dream of building unbreakable systems

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Def Con China, 2018.5



# Why Memory Safety matters?

While everybody talks about AI, Blockchain and so on



# TensorFlow/Caffe/Torch Vulnerabilities

- There are many vulnerabilities in popular DL frameworks
- Consequences
  - DoS Attacks
  - Evasion attacks
  - System Compromise

DL Framework	dep. packages	CVE-ID	Potential Threats
Tensorflow	numpy	CVE-2017-12852	DOS
Tensorflow	wave.py	CVE-2017-14144	DOS
Caffe	libjasper	CVE-2017-9782	heap overflow
Caffe	openEXR	CVE-2017-12596	crash
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12597	heap overflow
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12598	crash
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12599	crash
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12600	DOS
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12601	crash
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12602	DOS
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12603	crash
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12604	crash
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12605	crash
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-12606	crash
Caffe/Torch	opencv	CVE-2017-14136	integer overflow

[\*] Security Risks in Deep Learning Implementations, Qixue Xiao et al



# Python NumPy Vulnerability vs Bigdata Platforms

- Escape Python sandboxes or compromise bigdata cloud services

## Quantifying the risk

It is well known that much of Python's core and many third-party modules are thin wrappers of C code. Perhaps less recognized is the fact that memory corruption bugs are reported in popular Python modules all the time without so much as a CVE, a security advisory, or even a mention of security fixes in release notes.

So yes, there are **a lot** of memory corruption bugs in Python modules. Surely not all of them are exploitable, but you have to start somewhere. To reason about the risk posed by memory corruption bugs, I find it helpful to frame the conversation in terms of two discrete use-cases: regular Python applications, and sandboxing untrusted code.

[\*] <https://hackernoon.com/python-sandbox-escape-via-a-memory-corruption-bug-19dde4d5fea5>



# Smart Driving - Could memory corruption kill a person?

- Unintentional acceleration by memory corruption

MADISON, Wis. — Could bad code kill a person? It could, and it apparently did.

The Bookout v Toyota Motor Corp. case, which blamed sudden acceleration in a Toyota Camry for a wrongful death, touches the issue directly.

we found a set of bugs that specifically can cause memory corruption. So they're lurking there. And if they happen, then as a result of that, then the some critical variable could be -- could have a new value, for example, the throttle commend could become instead of opening 20 percent opening 50 percent letting in a lot more air and giving the engine a lot more power.

[\*] [https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc\\_id=1319903](https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1319903)



# Pwn2Own Every Year





# GeekPwn Every Year

## 极棒上发现的漏洞影响十亿级别IoT





# Towards a dream of building unbreakable systems

- Defense-in-depth is an effective strategy for enterprise security
  - Vulnerabilities and exploits can be contained in multiple defenses
- But AI-based systems demand far better security
  - No enough defense-in-depth for smart home devices
  - Unwanted crash is an effective mitigation for browsers against exploits, but unwanted crashes might be fatal in a self-driving system



# Memory Safety

And unsafety



# Memory safety

- Memory safety is the state of being protected from various software bugs and security vulnerabilities when dealing with memory access, such as buffer overflows and dangling pointers. <sup>[1]</sup>
- Spatial error <sup>[2]</sup>
  - Dereferencing an out-of-bounds pointer
- Temporal error <sup>[2]</sup>
  - Dereferencing a dangling pointer


[1] [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory\\_safety](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_safety)

[2] SoK: Eternal War in Memory, Laszlo Szekeres, Mathias Payer, Tao Wei, Dawn Song, S&P 2013



# Memory safety in Programming Languages

- Most of modern high-level languages are designed with memory-safe features.
  - Rust
  - Go
  - Swift
  - Javascript
  - Python
  - Java
  - Ethereum Solidity
  - .....





# Memory Unsafety in “Memory-safe” Programming Languages

- Java’s JVM
- Python’s C libs
- Swift’s Object-C runtime
- Javascript’ GC engine
- Go’s asm code
- Rust’s unsafe
- .....



# Practical Memory Safety

- Pure memory safety is impractical for real world applications today
- Practical Memory Safety is layered & hybrid
- **3 principals** for a hybrid memory-safe architecture
  - [Proposed in Baidu X-Lab Rust SGX SDK]
  - Unsafe components must not taint safe components, especially for public APIs and data structures
  - Unsafe components should be as small as possible and decoupled from safe components
  - Unsafe components should be explicitly marked during deployment and ready to upgrade



# Practical Memory-safe Projects by Baidu X-Lab

- Rust SGX SDK: Write Intel SGX applications in Rust
- MesaLock Linux: A Memory-Safe Linux Distribution



- MesaLink: A Memory-safe OpenSSL-compatible TLS Library



- And more to come soon



# Re: Why Memory Safety is important

- Memory unsafe programs contain hidden control flow/data flow by breaking memory boundaries
  - The analysis cost becomes too high to be practical for real-world applications
- Memory safety makes control flows and data flows explicit
  - Security audit is much easier
    - Web/Android Java audit vs. Windows/Linux binary audit
  - Classical formal verification has not fully made use of this feature yet



# Non-bypassable Security Paradigm (NbSP)

Towards formal verification of security properties of control flows



# Is Memory safety Hackproof?

- Just one step further, but not bullet-proof
- Control-flow hijacking is still possible
  - Android JavaScript Bridge
  - Java Reflection abuse
  - Struts2 OGNL vulnerabilities
  - .....
- Data-flow vulnerabilities are still possible
  - Sql Injections
  - Solidity Integer overflow
  - .....



# Case study: Control-flow hijacking

- SIDEWINDER TARGETED ATTACK AGAINST ANDROID IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF AD LIBRARIES
  - Yulong Zhang, Tao Wei, Blackhat 2014
  - Use popular ad libs to intercept location information, opening the door to targeting specific areas (say, a CEO's office), and then **take photos or record videos remotely**
  - Android JavaScript-binding-over-http + Java reflection abuse
  - No memory-unsafe vulnerability exploited

```
jsObj.getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime")  
.getMethod("getRuntime",null).invoke(null,null).exec(cmd)
```



# From Memory Safety To Formal Verification

- Machine-checkable formal verification is the only theoretically unbreakable hackproof methodology today, **the holy grail**
  - But the cost is too high to fully verify most of real world applications
  - Layered formal verification is a promising direction
- Memory Safety
  - Make control flows and data flows explicit, but
    - **Control-flow hijacking is still possible**
  - Data-flow vulnerabilities are still possible
- Non-bypassable Security Paradigm (NbSP)
  - Based on memory safety
  - **Layered formal verification of security properties of control flow**





# Non-bypassable Security

- Introduced by MILS (Multiple Independent Levels of Security/Safety)
- It requires that one component cannot use another communication path, including lower level mechanisms to bypass the security monitor
- Critical security checkpoints should be guaranteed to be non-bypassable
  - Authentication
  - Authorization
  - Auditing
  - .....




# Non-bypassable Security Paradigm

## Control-flow Formal Verification for Memory-safe Applications

- We just need to make sure that **all the paths** between sources (e.g. input) and sinks (e.g. database operations) **MUST contain critical security checkpoints**
  - **Formal machine-checkable verifications**
- Advantages
  - Straight-forward for direct control flows
  - **Control flow graph is explicit**, and we don't need to dig hidden control flows generated by memory unsafety
- Challenges
  - **Alias analysis**: function pointers, reflections and so on
  - Can not guarantee both **soundness (no FN)** and **completeness (no FP)** at the same time




# Indirect-bypassable challenges





# Use different types to block potential bypass






# Non-bypassable Security Paradigm

## A Sound Solution (no FN)

- Machine-checkable formal verification
  - Explore **all the potential control flows** in a given memory-safe program, including direct and indirect ones
  - **Reject if any path** between a source and a sink **bypasses** given checkpoints
- Software design and implementation
  - Remove unnecessary direct bypasses, or add missed checkpoints
  - Use **different function types** to block unwanted indirect bypasses





# Non-bypassable Security Paradigm

Towards full formal verification of security checkpoints

- All the paths towards checkpoints are known
- Data-flow formal verification for all these paths is the next step, against
  - Sql Injections
  - Integer overflow
  - .....
- A practical layered solution of formal verification
  - Depend on layered memory safety assumptions





# Conclusions

Towards the dream of building unbreakable systems



# From Memory Safety To Non-bypassable Security Paradigm

- Memory Safety and software security is even more important along with Cloud, AI, Blockchain, IoT, Smart driving ...
- Memory Safety makes control flows and data flows explicit
  - The pre-condition of *sound* verification (no false negatives)
- Non-bypassable Security Paradigm (NbSP) guarantees that critical checkpoints are non-bypassable, i.e. no missed/hidden paths
  - A practical trade-off between design/implementation and analysis completeness
  - Machine-checkable formal verification of security properties of control flows
- NbSP reduces attack surfaces significantly to critical checkpoints
  - Authentication, authorization, auditing and so on
  - NbSP makes it practical for further formal verification (data flows)



# Welcome to join our open-source memory-safe projects

- Rust SGX SDK: Write Intel SGX applications in Rust
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# Thanks!

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